August 10, 2010 – Federalist No. 75 – The Treaty Making Power of the Executive, For the Independent Journal (Hamilton) – Guest Blogger: Nathaniel Stewart, attorney and fellow at the Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs
Tuesday, August 10th, 2010
In Federalist #75, Alexander Hamilton explains and defends the power of the President to make treaties with foreign nations “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate.” The treaty-making power granted in Article II section 2 involves, as Hamilton observes, another example of an “intermixture of powers,” a power shared by the President and the smaller house of Congress.
Hamilton acknowledges four arguments levied against this particular arrangement and addresses them each in turn. First, there are those who would vest the power in the President alone. Second, there are some who called for the power to reside only in the Senate. Still others called for the House of Representatives to hold a share of the treaty power. And finally, having answered these objections, Hamilton explains why treaties may be approved by only “two-thirds of the Senators present,” rather than two-thirds of the whole body.
Hamilton begins with the initial explanation that the power to make treaties does not readily fit within either the legislative or administrative functions of government. Here, Hamilton reminds his audience of the precise functions of these two branches of government, and distills them neatly: “The essence of the legislative authority is to enact laws, or, in other words, to prescribe rules for the regulation of society; while the execution of the laws and the employment of the common strength, either for this purpose or for the common defense, seem to comprise all the functions of the executive magistrate.”
But the power to negotiate a treaty, Hamilton argues, does not involve enacting a new law or enforcing an old one. Treaties are not laws, they are contracts. They enjoy “the force of law” derived from “the obligation of good faith,” but they are not laws as between a sovereign and its subject, or rules which must be obeyed. Rather, a treaty is a contract between two sovereigns, and thus, the treaty-making power is a distinct and peculiar function, neither purely legislative nor wholly administrative. This provides the foundation for Hamilton’s contention that the treaty power be shared between the branches, rather than vested in only one.
Turning then to the contention that the President alone should wield this power, Hamilton repeats the common refrain that history proves power to be all too tempting for men to resist. The hereditary monarch, he notes, has too much at stake – given the length of his lifelong reign – to risk being corrupted by a foreign nation. But such is not the case with a man elected for a mere four years; a man who may have risen to the rank of President from a more modest station, and for whom a foreign allegiance might then prove quite valuable when his term of office has expired. To entrust this great authority in such an elected official would be “utterly unsafe and improper,” lest he be “tempted to betray the interests of the state to the acquisition of wealth.”
But this does not mean that the power should rest with only the Senate, for this would deprive the President of too much authority in foreign relations and negotiations. The President is to enjoy “the confidence and respect” of other nations, and the Senate, as a legislative body, is unlikely to command such foreign confidence. Thus, the country would lose the benefit of the President’s unique position among the nations were he to be excluded from the treaty process. For Hamilton it is then clear that the “greater prospect of security” for the country lies in the joint sharing of the treaty-making power.
Despite the prudence of this “intermixture” between the Senate and the President, Hamilton resists the call to include the House of Representatives in the treaty power. Treaties, he argues, require a set of qualities which cannot be expected from such a large and “fluctuating” body of representatives. Treaties require “accurate and comprehensive knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and systematic adherence to the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to national character, decision, secrecy, and dispatch.” The design of the House of Representatives is not conducive to these qualities and would only muddy the waters at potentially critical and inopportune moments of decision. While we might wonder today whether even the Senate possesses the requisite “uniform sensibility” that Hamilton envisioned, one would be hard pressed to quibble with his foresight in resisting the call to extend the treaty-power to the ever-ephemeral House of Representatives.
Finally, the author takes up the challenge that treaties ought to be ratified by two-thirds of the whole Senate, rather than merely “two-thirds of those present.” Anytime a super-majority, like two-thirds, is required for an approval, the matter is increasingly beholden to the will of a select minority, rather than that of the majority. Hamilton rightly recognized that the treaty-making power would be no exception. Requiring two-thirds majority of the entire body to affirm a treaty risked the possibility that a minority of Senators could defeat the measure simply by not appearing to vote on it. On the other hand, such gamesmanship would be discouraged and unrewarded by allowing the treaty to pass with the support of only a super-majority of those present.
The treaty-making power is a shared power. Not a legislative function, nor an executive’s role, a treaty represents a bond between two sovereign powers, likely the culmination of a negotiation, a settling of terms. It is for this reason that Presidents must enjoy enough power to broker the terms of the agreement, while a discrete and noble body of another branch ensures that such power is only invoked in the best interests of the nation and its security.
Nathaniel Stewart is an attorney in Washington, DC, and a fellow at the Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs